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Not I in Rockaby 
Daniel Davy 
It, say it, not knowing what. . . But I did nothing. I seem 
to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not about me. 
—The Unnamable 
This signification is formed only within the hollow of 
differance, of discontinuity and discreteness, of the 
diversion and of the reserve of what does not appear. 
— Jacques Derrida 
One other living soul. 
— Rockaby 
The motif of the fragmented, absent, or in some way "negated" subject 
has long played a significant role in the work of Samuel Beckett. The following 
passages, extracted from a variety of works, appearing at different times in Beckett's 
career, illustrate this recurring theme: 
. . . you feel nothing, strange, you don't feel a mouth on you, 
you don't feel your mouth any more, no need of a mouth, the 
words are everywhere, inside me, outside me, well well, a minute 
ago I had no thickness, I hear them, no need to hear them, no 
need of a head, impossible to stop them, impossible to stop, I'm 
in words, made of words, others' words, what others, the place 
too, the air, the walls, the floor, the ceiling, all words, the whole 
world is here with me, I'm the air, the walls, the walled-in one 
Daniel Davy is an Associate Professor of Theatre in the Department of Speech Communication, 
Theatre and Dance at Kansas State University. He holds a Ph.D in Dramatic Art from the 
University of California at Santa Barbara and has published articles in Essays in Theatre, Eire-
Ireland, Modern Drama, and the Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism. 
4 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
Your mind never active at any time is now even less than ever so. 
This is the type of assertion he does not question. You saw the 
light on such and such a day and your mind never active at any 
time is now even less than ever so. Yet a certain activity of mind 
however slight is a necessary adjunct of company. That is why 
the voice does not say, You are on your back in the dark and have 
no mental activity of any kind. The voice alone is company but 
not enough.2 
In the skull all gone. All? No. All cannot go. Till dim go. Say 
then but the two gone. In the skull one and two gone. From the 
void. From the stare. In the skull all save the skull gone.3 
(sic) in me that were without when the panting stops scraps of 
an ancient voice in me not mine (sic)4 
When I think, no, that won't work . . . 5 
This "problem of the subject" becomes problematic in another sense as 
we turn from the prose work to drama, where the objective nature of the form— 
lines spoken by actors in the theater, and the necessity for graphic representation 
of the entire play—renders interior scenes within the mind exceptionally difficult. 
Given the prominence of this motif of the "negated subject" throughout Beckett's 
career, it is perhaps no accident that the "objective scenes" of many of Beckett's 
earlier and famous works for the theater are themselves in the manner of fragments, 
strange half worlds without directly expressive, perhaps, of the strange half worlds 
within of the characters that inhabit them—"Not Fs" in the "Nowheres" of Godot, 
Happy Days, and Endgame. The explicit reference to "Not I" will of course come 
later in the theater in the "dramaticules," as they have been called,6 where 
progressively diminished "subjects" inhabit the progressively diminished "objects" 
of what remains of the worlds of their respective plays. This theme and relationship 
seems quite consistent in Beckett, but in a larger sense consistent as well within the 
fabric of modem drama in which Beckett's work plays so important a role. "Objects" 
recede in significance in many of the early masterpieces of the late nineteenth 
century because of their perceived irrelevance, their denial of affective significance; 
one thinks of Hedda Gabler's indifferent contempt for her comfortable and proper 
"home," and the solipsism and introspective turn within of so many of Chekhov's 
characters. But, as the outer world dwindles so does the inner, initiating that 
stereotypically modern "quest for meaning" in any world as the sharp distinctions 
between subject and object also recede: the talismanic "Moscow" evolves—or 
devolves—into the enigmatic "Godot" later in Beckett, and finally contracts into 
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merely "somewhere," "there," in the beautiful and appalling rhythms of Rockaby. 
What is the essential nature of the dilemma of the protagonist in this play? 
Although various alternative interpretations have been suggested, I would agree 
with those who have argued that the presentation of a single protagonist, despite 
the theatrical division between "W" ("Woman" in Rocker) and "V" (offstage, 
recorded "Voice"), is clearly Beckett's intention in the play. Hersh Zeifman notes 
Beckett's ambiguous presentation of protagonists as both "subjects" and projected 
"objects" of—or within—themselves ("pseudocouples," as he calls them) in Not I, 
Ohio Impromptu, and Footfalls, but declares; "The significant shift in this pattern 
in Rockaby is that both speaker and listener are the same person—literally, and not 
just perhaps symbolically as in other Beckett plays."7 "They" are one and yet 
divided, a predicament in common with so many other subjects in the Beckett 
canon. What divides them? Charles Lyons, in the process of describing and 
clarifying some of the essential relationships in the play, identifies, in my view, the 
essence of the problem: 
The fragments that constitute Rockaby imply but do not confirm 
certain relationships between parts. For example, we assume 
that the voice, V, is the inner voice of the woman, W, and that 
the she of the narrative is the woman, W, who rocks in the chair 
invoking the story-telling voice. The published text of the play 
indicates that W and V are played by the same actress so that we 
assume that V is the recorded voice of the actress performing 
W. We also know that in his later plays Beckett divides the 
physical presence of the character from a voice that tells a story. 
We assume that this division represents, theatrically, the 
character's perception—and ours—of the difference between 
speaking or telling and the self-conscious awareness of that 
speech as memory, invention, or at least, sound."8 (my final 
emphasis) 
How innocent and natural it sounds, this "difference!" One "speaks", and one is 
"aware" that one does so as one does so. As a human "action" such a depiction 
seems almost absurdly commonplace, and, yet, it is the very mundaneness of its 
fundamental nature that conceals its near apocalyptic implications, at least within 
the sensibility of this play. The difficulty lies in the "movement" of consciousness 
from the unity of "one" (who speaks) to the duality of "speaking" and the concurrent 
"awareness" that the act is in process. The precise or at least stable configuration 
of mind or identity within—a kind of "noun"—mutates via this "process"—a kind 
of "verb"—that connects the self to the outside world. Even as one "reaches out 
to touch someone" ("Someone there . . . "), one loses "one"—subject, "self—in 
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the quest for another—an "other," an object.9 We see variations of this dilemma 
implied in Beckett's earlier drama. As Charles Lyons observes, "In Happy Days we 
witness the epistemological struggle of Winnie who cannot sustain a coherent 
image of herself in time apart from the moment by moment invention of herself as an 
object in her own consciousness."10 One must "invent" because the reality of self 
is forever self-obscured. Thus the general "problem of the subject" with which we 
began would seem to be clearly identified, as Lyons will go on to say of the Rockaby 
protagonist: 
What we see (and hear) in Rockaby appears to be the self-
objectification of a character. In this play the / is reduced to the 
equivocal perception of the Woman who revolves a recitation in 
her mind as the story of another, not herself, and yet herself.11 
This formulation, however accurate it may be, seems subtly flawed and 
incomplete. The "problem" within the self or human consciousness dramatized 
by Beckett would appear to lie in the interface of the subject-object relationship. 
Insofar as one is "out," the integrity of "in" is violated; insofar as one stays "in"— 
mute and still like "Worm" 1 2 in The Unnamable—contact with "out" is entirely 
severed. Hence the weirdly "improvised" feeling of both subjective and objective 
environments in a play such as Happy Days, where a kind of perpetual, half 
successful, half collapsed sort of "compromise" seems to be in place. 
But within this conception, if the day is not "happy," neither is it altogether 
unhappy: one can have either "subject," or "object," or fragments of both at the 
same time. But what if one could have nothing at all? I would argue that this is 
precisely the dilemma of the Rockaby protagonist (and arguably, that which is 
central in other "late" Beckett dramatic works as well), one that engenders both 
the unique "theatricalist" frame constructed by Beckett to express this dilemma, 
and also the sense of savage alienation that pervades the entire play. 
This notion of an absolute loss of self has been articulated in the 
deconstructive philosophy of Jacques Derrida; Derrida's concept of differance 
functions, in my view, as a remarkably accurate paradigm and formula describing 
the dilemma of the protagonist in Rockaby. The concept of differance—pivotal to 
Derrida's entire philosophy—is in a sense quite simple, while at the same time 
remarkably complex and adept at eluding clear definition.13 One way of grasping 
the basic dynamic of this idea as it operates in the mind is to compare it to another 
famous dramatic example of a "problem of the subject": that featured in Pirandello's 
Six Characters in Search of an Author}5 The Father's well-known speech in this 
play which calls into question the nature of human identity is disturbing enough, 
but it pales before the abyss of differance.14 Pirandello's vision of the mind's 
interior landscape is one in which the subject suffers constant, gradual mutation, 
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eventually issuing forth in a "self bearing little or no resemblance to an earlier or 
original version. But in Pirandello, a "self nevertheless exists, even though subject 
to perpetual erosion. Pirandello thus postulates an implicit hierarchy: self/mutation. 
Self exists prior to mutation and establishes the ground of mutation's operation. 
Derrida's differance reverses this hierarchy. Mutation is prior to self. As this 
unceasing process is co-terminus with (human) life itself (the primordial and initial 
illusory phenomenon of "self consciousness"), the self never "arrives," as it were, 
and is thus revealed as illusory, never having existed in the first place (or any other 
place).1 6 
One of the obvious derivatives of Derrida's argument is simply that of 
another voice in the old "idealism vs. materialism" debate, with Derrida's analysis 
leading emphatically to the latter view. Yet another affirmation of philosophical 
materialism is not particularly consequential; what is significant with reference to 
Beckett and Rockaby is the specific "intrapsychic" logic that leads to this conclusion, 
and the medium of that logic, which is language.17 It is a commonplace of criticism 
that Beckett uses language in distinctive and unique ways, and it is equally 
commonplace to observe that Derrida deconstructs language "texts" previously 
regarded as embodying stable meaning. However, it would seem to me most 
useful to apply Derrida to Beckett from a parallel rather than a dialectical perspective. 
As I will argue, "character" in Rockaby has already undergone artistic 
"deconstruction" via a logic that parallels Derrida's critical theory. Therefore, "text" 
as such, or "language" as text, is not really the primary issue in Rockaby in the 
usual implied sense of the gradual construction of "character," but is rather only a 
kind of symptomatic derivative, the residual but superbly articulated "print" left 
behind of the playwright's effort to manifest "consciousness/self and its dilemma 
as immediately and as acutely as possible. Following Derrida, therefore, we should 
approach the text of Rockaby not as the "expression" of the subject (subject as 
something: "noun"), but as the there/not there manifestation of "subjectivity" 
itself (simply "energy": subject as "verb"), a phenomenon that can only be expressed 
or "recorded" indirectly, rather like the quanta in particle physics, or "red shift" data 
in astronomy measuring the velocity of distant objects. 
There are a number of general elements in the play that are directly 
suggestive of the energy of differance as "subject" in the manner indicated by 
Derrida. The basic rhythm of the play, the continual "movement" of the text—the 
absence of punctuation18 and the constant repetition, as though always doubling 
back, circling, searching—seems almost a replica of the concept of differance in 
aesthetic form. The textual subject cannot "rest" as it is engendered and constituted 
only by and in itself—"textuality," the constant movement of differance. In the 
same fashion, if the text does not seem to even temporarily conclude or rest, neither 
does it "begin" despite "starting," in a sense, not once but twice via Beckett's 
theatrically bifurcated protagonist: W's "More" is followed by V's "till in the end/ 
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the day came . . . . " and so forth. But "more" obviously implies a prior process of 
some sort—"more" of the same—and thus the origin or "beginning" of the dramatic 
process we are given to witness is conspicuously absent. V's second "beginning" 
is equally absent;19 as Charles Lyons has pointed out, V's opening narrative 
"constitutes an extended subordinate clause that, if it were housed in a complete 
sentence, would delimit some statement of activity that we do not hear."20 V, like W, 
is thus already "in process" from the very outset of the play; the dramatic subject 
of Rockaby is indeed a "subordinate clause" within not simply a sentence, but an 
identity without beginning or end, origin or closure. In a lesser, but still significant, 
fashion, the form or "image" of the text—a narrow column surrounded by blank 
space—together with its brevity, is also suggestive of the constraint of differance: 
the "energy" of the text, and subject, inhabits only a kind of crawlspace of the 
psyche, originating nowhere and leading to nothing. 
In theatrical terms, differance is also strongly implied by the sole physical 
action of the play: rocking. "Rocking" as an action is non-linear in the same fashion 
as the textual structure of the play. Textually, the "self does not express or 
"transact" with the world, and thus is forever "moving" "to and fro," and so also in 
purely theatrical terms: "rocking" goes nowhere; it only "circles," as it were, like 
the text, and is as a physical action only a kind of "energy," the pure "vibration" 
that constitutes the sole existence of the protagonist. It is also highly significant 
that Beckett does not even allow W to "rock herself," for this would suggest the 
very "transaction" that both the textual structure and theatrical "rocking" seem 
designed to negate: protagonist rocks, noun expresses verb, and the self authenticates 
its autonomous existence. Katherine Worth points out that the rocking of the chair 
is "a force that is moving . . . (W)"2 1; it is thus an agency external to "self-
expression," a disjunction engineered by Beckett's simple stage direction: "Rock: 
Slight. Slow. Controlled mechanically without assistance from W"22 The audience 
witnesses this external power, but through a glass darkly as it were, as the initial 
stage direction reads: "Light: Subdued on chair. Rest of stage dark." (273) The 
audience thus sees that W is not rocking "herself," but the peripheral focus—at the 
"bottom" of the stage image, and dimly lit—creates only a kind of impressionistic 
sense of the point; equally impressionistically, the audience senses or is made to 
feel that W is rocking herself, simply because the image and the relationship it 
implies is logical, and inherently commonplace and natural. Thus W, in theatrical 
terms, both "is" and "is not" rocking herself, a differential fluctuation of 
"subjectivity that is perfectly expressive of the logic of differance.23 
However, there would appear to be an obvious contradiction of this point. 
"Rocking" is clearly initiated by W as "she" rather than V articulates the "More" at 
the outset of the play, and of each section, immediately prior to the onset of rocking 
and the speech of V. W, at least at these junctures, appears unambiguously in 
command, "acting," and thus authenticating herself as "actor": subject. This point 
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is, in my view, central to the meaning and significance of the entire play and also 
legitimizes Rockaby as a play rather than simply a "dramatic poem," as a number of 
commentators have suggested. For the protagonist of Rockaby, trapped not "in" 
but "as" the mechanism of differance, is, via that very dilemma, "self conscious," a 
reality of "subjectivity" if but an illusion of "subject." And Beckett has given her, 
as the very first condition of the play, a kind of awareness of her condition. This 
awareness is of a piece with the entire fabric of the play—it fluctuates, it is there/not 
there, but it drives the action of the play every bit as vigorously as the ambition of 
Macbeth, or the eroticism of Phaedra: W/V desires. But what is the object of her 
desire? The great majority of answers to this question revolve around the simple 
naturalistic scenario of an isolated and acutely lonely old woman attempting to 
make meaningful human contact. As Jane Hale puts it, "This woman has spent her 
entire life trying to see and be seen by another."24 In all such cases, the sought after 
"other" is, quite obviously, another human being, an entity external to the identity 
and consciousness of the protagonist. This basic perspective seems obvious 
enough, but perhaps too obvious in a play otherwise characterized by numerous 
striking theatrical and dramaturgical innovations in traditional dramatic form. Bert 
States has pointed out that the overall trend of Beckett's dramatic work progressively 
"reduce(s) the social nature of dramatic mimesis," and that the late "voice" plays 
give us "some idea of what might happen to solid social drama if you bled away 
everything but the spectacle of consciousness at its center."25 I would argue that 
the implied social dimension in Rockaby is illusory, that the real content and focus 
of the play lies within rather than without, and that the sought after "other" with 
whom W/V desires vital human contact, "another living soul" as she later puts it, is 
her own. 
The protagonist of Rockaby seeks this goal not only entirely within 
consciousness, but as consciousness, a matrix both brought into being and wholly 
formed by the "process" stream of ideations, expressed as language—subjectzvzjfy 
—that constitutes her sole existence. She is conscious of her "self only as this 
content, "self conscious" only as these objectifications projected against a wholly 
nebulous ground ("somewhere there"), but objects, not subject, not I.2 6 And she 
knows it. Hence the search for the "other" which forms the "action," conflict and 
drama of the play. What is this "other?" By its very nature it cannot be known, 
and yet is intimately sensed or intuited—its presence yearned for, its absence 
mourned. It is the logos of subjectivity, the thinker beyond or "behind" the thought 
with whom the protagonist seeks union and completion. But it is the very proximity 
and intuition of this 'other' that generates its distance and obscurity; "known" 
only as 'other,' the very word in the play operates in a kind of uncanny harmony 
with the principle of differance. It not only generates a host of derivative "others"— 
another, (m)other, own other, etc—but its very meaning changes, as we shall see, 
in a kind of "anti-zen," yin and yang correspondence with the protagonist as she 
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moves through the play. 
One element in the play, however, is quite consistent with traditional 
dramatic form: it features a late point of attack. WW's quest has apparently been 
going on for a very long time. The invocation "More", which opens the play, is 
almost immediately followed by the exhortation to "stop," a relationship which of 
course continues throughout the play. As these contradictory injunctions refer to 
an "action" so intimately tied to the principle of identity—indeed, "within" that 
sphere—they tend to continually nullify that identity, an operation consistent with 
the function of differance. Also consistent is the use of the double third person 
pronoun ("when she said/ to herself . . ." 275) as a stand in for "I"—identity as 
object, "other"—and the verb "stopped" which suggests an arbitrary point on a 
continuum, rather than an invocation of closure. Let us also consider the odd, 
idiomatic langauge used to initially describe the quest: "going to and fro/ all eyes/ 
all sides/ high and low . . . " (275). There is a suggestion of formlessness in this 
expression which is much more evocative of the kind of free-form "roaming" one 
conducts in the mind rather than of the kind of activity conducted in the necessarily 
more structured and constrained outer world. The implication is thus once again of 
an internal dramatic focus and action, rather than an objective one. 
All of these motifs occur in rapid succession in the first section of the 
play, prior to the initial description of the protagonist's objective: "for another/ 
another like herself/ another creature like herself/ a little like/..." (275). The "other" 
is thus initially designated "another," in section one, and derivative terms—other, 
mother, own other—will be consecutively introduced in sections two through four 
respectively. This deployment, along with subtle changes in emphasis and a series 
of strategically introduced new terms duly employed as the play proceeds— 
"window," "blind," "pane," "living soul," and others, very specifically suggests a 
constantly intensifying internal drama in which the protagonist grapples with the 
ground of her own being in an effort to transcend its limitations, fails repeatedly 
and emotionally responds to this failure, and finally surrenders and subsides into a 
defeated silence. 
The constant stress in the play that the "other" must be "like herself 
implies some near duplicate of W/V's own identity rather than a second "other" 
human being; however, if loneliness or isolation in a conventional naturalistic 
sense is the issue here, would not almost any "other" type of sympathetic mind, 
heart or ear do? The oft quoted line of another famous "searcher" of modern 
drama, Blanche Dubois—"I have always depended on the kindness of strangers"— 
did not additionally specify that anonymous compassion or empathy would be 
welcome only from a second Blanche DuBois. Such a caveat would not be— 
emotionally—logical, and it is not logical here to assume this demand. But with 
"another" as her internal object W/V expresses a degree of emotional optimism at 
the outset of the play: "another," a replica, like me, close to me, perhaps success is 
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possible! 
Thus, in section two there is an indication of an intensification of action 
and its direction as expressed in a single line, "went back in," which is then followed 
by a whole cluster of material conspicuously new (as is "went back in") in the lyrical 
stream of harmony and repetition that precedes it: "window," "quiet at her window," 
"let up the blind," "only window," "another living soul," and the term "other," 
introduced for the first time in conjunction with "living soul." The most significant 
of these new elements is the term "living soul." If this language is indeed projecting 
a naturalistic scenario, with "another living soul" as a "second human" to put 
alongside the protagonist, then clearly W/V is indirectly describing herself as a 
"living soul" in the same phrase as her sought after object. "Living soul" would 
thus function as a passively assumed synonym for "I." But such an interpretation— 
in which the protagonist automatically assumes her own identity in terms which 
imply belief in an autonomous ground of being, ultimately based in a transcendent, 
spiritual dimension—seems remarkably complacent given the acute and pervasive 
sense of alienation projected by the entire play. I would argue that Beckett is using 
the phrase not in terms which imply an assumed identification with "I," but as a 
deeply ironic "spiritual" label designating the absent "other" self that W/V struggles 
to locate, "somewhere there," within herself. 
The quest for the "living soul" is conducted in a very close correspondence 
with, or through, the protagonist's "window," perhaps the most prominent term or 
element in the play appearing to lend credence to a naturalistic interpretation of 
the play's basic scenario. But what exactly is a "window" in this context? 
Objectively, it is the window in the house within which the lonely woman sits, 
peering out to connect with humankind. But, this very image calls attention to the 
subtle theatricalization inherent in this relationship: a "window," like a proscenium 
arch, is a framing device enabling the viewer to perceive the scene it encloses. 
"Scene," in the theater, is of course "unreal," fictional; it is only an artful 
representation of the larger reality the theatrical imagery seeks to convey. Void of 
its representations the theater reverts to its true status as an "empty space"; in like 
fashion, a "window" without reference to content frames vacancy. A window is a 
mediumless medium; it is both there and not there, the very dilemma of "self as 
differance. Is the protagonist of Rockaby only a "window" unto herself? Considered 
both as medium and content, "window" as synonym for "I" is nothing—no 
"thing"—but reflects only an image of the reality it seeks in vain to capture. 
But, the strategy for the pursuit of subjective reality has narrowed and 
intensified in section two; no longer going "to and fro," W/V now "sits," "quiet," at 
her window, as she has gone further "back in" to herself in pursuit of herself. Both 
the action to "sit" in juxtaposition with the earlier "to and fro," and the explicit 
"quiet"—repeated numerous times throughout the play—imply a more concentrated 
effort, a stilling of the psyche as the protagonist seeks to probe more deeply within 
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her own interior. Then who—or what—continues to "speak" even as "quiet" is 
invoked? The issue of language assuming a life of its own even when placed in 
the mouths or minds of "characters" is of course a commonplace of Beckett 
criticism. With reference to Rockaby, Steven Connor asserts that the protagonist 
"cannot control" the recorded voice, and Katherine Worth observes that "the 
recorded voice streams on along with the rocking motion: it is all bearing her along 
.. ."2 7 Here is the very dilemma of differance: "it" is "bearing her along," rather than 
"she"—"I" from her perspective—"bearing it along," a relationship in which the 
self articulates itself and thus legitimizes its autonomous existence. WW as identity 
is thus only the product—or by-product—of a "process" wholly extrinsic to her 
sense of "L" And what is this process but simply "nature," consciousness and its 
activity considered only as the objective function of the physical nervous system. 
There is an additional echo here of the central metaphor of "rocking," with its sense 
of rhythmic implacability suggesting the fundamental interior rhythms of nature— 
respiration and heartbeat—that are also "not I," but are so intimately involved with 
the life of the self. It is this sense of the implacable and inevitable in the play that 
seems to me to raise Rockaby to the stature of tragedy, a status not born of the 
Gods and their mystery or of ironic "mistakes" of the will, but simply of existence 
itself. The play's allusion to tragedy seems clearly intended given the terms "blind" 
and "pane" (introduced in section three) so closely associated with "window" (as 
subject), with the obvious reference to tragic "blindness" interacting with "pane," 
a term that functions as an almost perfect metaphor for "self in this context, as it 
simultaneously interpenetrates the notions of clarity of perception, vacancy, and 
suffering in a single image. 
The fourth and climactic section of Rockaby evokes an "other" far more 
concrete than any we have yet seen, "mother," a figure that is once again generally 
interpreted "naturalistically" as the protagonist's literal mother—an eerie, earlier 
replica of W/V and, possibly, W/V's dilemma. The particular manner in which 
"mother" is evoked, however, once again raises the question if a subjective rather 
than objective referent is not the real issue here: 
in the end went down 
down the steep stair 
let down the blind and down 
right down 
into the old rocker 
mother rocker 
where mother rocked 
all the years 
all in black 
best black 
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sat and rocked 
rocked 
till her end came 
in the end came 
off her head they said 
gone off her head 
but harmless 
no harm in her 
dead one day 
no 
night 
dead one night 
in the rocker 
in her best black 
head fallen 
and the rocker rocking 
rocking away 
so in the end.... (280) 
On a "naturalistic" level it is simply peculiar that "mother" should be so 
strikingly similar to "daughter" in so many respects, particularly given the relatively 
exotic nature of the dilemma they seem to share.28 However, their near identical 
status is entirely appropriate if we consider "mother" as the alter ego of W/V, the 
not quite "I" of the protagonist's own identity. In this sense, "mother" would 
represent the totality of the psychic space inhabited by W/V—"consciousness"— 
the site or "home" of the paradoxical self that becomes "self conscious only as 
process. The intimate yet disjunctive nature of this relationship recalls the uniquely 
intimate relationship of mother and child, with "mother" as the literal "home" of 
the "other" when they are biologically "one" and yet apart, a relationship which is 
also replicated as pure "text"—"(m)other" contains "other." This "natural" intimacy 
is explicitly evoked in the line "mother rocker," which immediately precedes and 
is closely associated with the first reference to "mother" as ostensible parent. The 
allusion to "mother nature" seems clearly intended, particularly as coupled with 
"rocker," which is itself arguably the most powerful theatrical element in the play 
suggesting the objective mechanism of natural forces. This relationship is then 
additionally reinforced by M/V's anticipation of her own death, a natural event, 
but of no significance in the larger continuum of nature as "rocking" continues, 
absorbing the energy of (not) "I" within its larger rhythm: 
dead one night 
in the rocker 
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in her best black 
head fallen 
and the rocker rocking 
rocking away (280) 
Finally, "mother's" characterization as having "gone off her head" is virtually a 
literal statement of MTV's dilemma as I have described it: she is "in" her head but 
"off it; she is "not herself," not I. 
The "memory of mother" constitutes a conscious and deliberate recall of 
the long duration of W/V's struggle ("all the years/ all in black/...."), and marks a 
transition to the play's final movement into resignation and surrender. "Rocking" 
has constituted the "natural" matrix of W/V's effort; in so struggling, she has in 
effect resisted this force even as it has engaged her. Now, however, "rocking" and 
its significance is consciously evoked via its articulation as language—"the old 
rocker"—rather than simply functioning as the passive/active theatrical site of self 
"process," as exhibited in the text and language of the play. Thus, W/V, rather than 
merging the "process" and "site" aspects of consciousness in a new unity of "I," 
approaches, instead, only a more grotesque kind of "union" of both textual and 
theatrical aspects of "process" alone. In this context, such a coalescence seems a 
clear signal of surrender, particularly as the "rocker" is so immediately linked to 
death ("dead one day/ no/ night/ dead one night")29, a reference which would seem 
to be openly affirmed in the line, "those arms at last." This process of surrender 
climaxes in the lines, "was her own other/own other living soul" (281), where the 
final union with the "other" occurs only in the terms indicated above—"subject 
ivity" comes to final rest and resignation only as that "other" status. This "reversal" 
of the significance of the key term "other" finds an additional emphasis in the 
remarkable clumsiness of the verbal construction employed—(not) I speaks in the 
"first" person as "she" which becomes the "other" of her "own" self—an 
awkwardness, a fundamental lack of viability, that parallels W/V's self-alienated 
condition. 
The final "note" of this beautifully musical play perhaps occurs not with 
the concluding "rock her off," but in the stillness which follows. As Linda Ben-Zvi 
has observed, "The unsaid 'more' is palpable in the silence."30 This "palpability" 
of nothing or emptiness, so characteristic of Beckett's work in a general sense, calls 
to mind another body of work in which the "search for the self is also paramount, 
the Vedic tradition of ancient India. Here also consciousness, as it is customarily 
experienced, is regarded only as the seat of maya or illusion, an illusion which 
persists until a condition known as "enlightenment" occurs. This condition, which 
is said to incorporate ananada or "bliss," "expansion" of the mind in some way, 
and even "union with God," is certainly radically at variance with the vision of 
Samuel Beckett.31 And yet there are a number of intriguing parallels between the 
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transcendental "light" of this Eastern tradition, and the dark void indwelling in 
Rockaby. In the Eastern vision, "emptiness" or absence is also "palpable," as it is 
believed that ultimate wisdom is expressible only as "silence"; any particularity of 
speech would only "break" this wholeness and define the finite. Hence, many of 
the Vedic texts are as austere in their verbal economy as are so many of Beckett's 
writings, and in like fashion frequently "express" only indirectly or even through 
negation. "Opposites converge," as Kierkegaard remarked, and it is arguably true 
that both the seers of the Veda and Samuel Beckett seek to approach the fundamental 
mystery of the human condition. In the Chandogya Upanishad, one who seeks 
the ultimate "truth" approaches a seer with a series of questions and possibilities, 
and to all of these the seer responds, "Neti, neti, n e t i . . . " ("Not that, not that, not 
that . . . " ) . 
Then what? "More." 
Notes 
1. Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable (New York: Grove, 1958) 139. 
2. Samuel Beckett, Company (New York: Grove, 1980) 9. 
3. Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho (New York: Grove, 1983) 26. 
4. Samuel Beckett, How It Is (New York, Grove, 1970) 31. 
5. Samuel Becket, Texts for Nothing (London: Calder & Boyars, 1974) 66. 
6. Beckett used the term originally as the sub-title for Come and Go; Keir Elam extends 
it to apply to the whole group of brief, late Beckett works for the theater. See Keir Elam, "Dead 
Heads: Damnation-Narration in the 'Dramaticules,'" in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. 
John Pilling (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 145-166. 
7. Hersh Zeifman, "'The Core of the Eddy': Rockaby and Dramatic Genre," in Beckett 
Translating/Translating Beckett, ed. Alan Warren Friedman, Charles Rossman & Dina Sherzer 
(University Park & London: Pennsylvania State UP, 1987) 141. The "other Beckett plays" referred 
to are of course other "dramaticules," and closely related in theme and form to Rockaby. 
8. Charles R. Lyons, "Perceiving Rockaby—As a Text, As a Text by Samuel Beckett, As 
a Text for Performance," Comparative Drama 16:4 (Winter, 1982-83) 303. 
9. I would thus disagree with those who formulate the problem on a traditionally cognitive 
or "intellectual" basis. Lois Oppenheim, for example, speaking of both the Not I and Rockaby 
protagonists, asserts: "Mouth's refusal to don the 'I,' like the old woman's quest in Rockaby...reveals 
not only the insufficient appropriation of the transcendental consciousness in the first-person pronoun, 
but that inability of consciousness to conceptualize itself in its totality of which we spoke a 
moment ago." Lois Oppenheim, "Anonymity and Individuation: The Interrelation of Two 
Linguistic Functions in Not I and Rockaby," in "Make Sense Who May": Essays on Samuel 
Beckett's Later Works, ed. Robin J. Davis & Lance St. John Butler (Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire, 
Colin Smythe, 1988) 42. Despite the problem as defined here, one can still "conceptualize" 
16 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
oneself because it is precisely such an habitual operation of self presentation, even if fashioned 
on a highly "cerebral" level, that conceals the deeper nature of the dilemma. The eye cannot see 
itself, and the mind, perhaps, cannot know itself, but it can imagine, or "conceive," its own 
nature. 
10. Lyons 300. The key idea here is "time" which implies consciousness of relative 
measure, an ideational "processing" which is ultimately grounded in "world" rather than "self." 
In "time" the mind is "out"; "in" mutates ("noun" dissolves in "verb"), and thus one must 
"invent" it. 
11. Lyons 302. Essentially the same point has been echoed by other critics as well. Jane 
Hale, for example, refers to Beckett's repeated theatrical strategy (in Rockaby, Eh Joe, Krapp's 
Last Tape, and That Time) of deploying a single character "listening" to a "voice" external to 
itself—as expressed in theatrical terms—as a "technique (that) serves both to indicate to the 
spectators that we are penetrating the consciousness of the mute character on stage and to 
dramatize the dual nature of human perception—the division o f every consciousness into a 
perceiving subject and a perceived object that can never coincide with each other . . ." Jane 
Alison Hale, The Broken Window: Beckett's Dramatic Perspective (West Lafayette, Indiana, 
Purdue UP, 1987) 135. 
12. "Worm," along with "Basil" and "Mahood," is one of the many "selves," "levels" of 
self, or "not" selves in Beckett's famous novel. 
13. Derrida himself puts the term "under erasure," a notion that is perhaps captured in the 
duality of its critical importance to his theory on the one hand, but on the other: " . . differance 
is not, does not exist, is not a present-being . . . in any form; and we will be led to delineate also 
everything that it is not, that is, everything; and consequently that it has neither existence nor 
essence" (Derrida's emphasis). Jacques Derrida, "Differance,"' in Jacques Derrida, Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982) 6. 
14. The Father has questioned the reality of the Stage Manager's identity; the Stage 
Manger responds impatiently as to the point of "asking these questions," and the Father rejoins: 
FATHER: [I ask t h e m ] . . . only in order to know if you, as you really are now, 
see yourself as you once were with all the illusions that were yours then, with 
all the things both inside and outside of you as they seemed to you—as they 
were then indeed for you. Well sir, if you think of all those illusions that mean 
nothing to you now, of all those things which don't even seem to you to exist 
any more, while once they were for you, don't you feel that—I won't say these 
boards—but the very earth under your feet is sinking away from you when you 
reflect that in the same way this you as you feel it today—all this present reality 
of yours—is fated to seem a mere illusion to you tomorrow? 
(Pirandello's emphasis) 
15. Luigi Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, in Luigi Pirandello, Naked 
Masks, Five Plays, ed. Eric Bentley (New York: Dutton, 1922) 265. 
Fall 2000 12 
16. The basic cluster of ideas comprising Derrida's wider philosophy, and which lead 
to such a conclusion and the concept o f differance, are by now well known and will be summarized 
here only very briefly. Derrida's strategy is essentially as follows: he begins by arguing that 
"writing" is prior to speech, as language cannot exist without first being inscribed within the 
social collective that uses it. The utility of this move lies with the point that it enables Derrida 
to decouple "meaning" (the "signified" e lement of a s ign as opposed to its "signifying" 
component—the phonic or graphic label that allows it to be spoken or written and communication 
to occur) from a cogni t ive act within the mind (and " s e l f ) as the origin of thought and 
communication. Derrida further argues that the most fundamental cognitive act of "self 
consciousness" (as in Descartes: "I think, therefore I am") is constituted in the signing, "writing" 
function ("I" cannot exist without thought which cannot exist without language). But as 
language—and "meaning," hence "thought"—is now derived from without rather than created 
originally from within, the "I" of the mind must acquire its ability to "think" and "be" from the 
meaning inscribed in the external exchange of language occurring within the social collective. 
But what is the source o f meaning if all other minds—"I"s—are so engaged? For Derrida, it 
exists only in what he calls the "trace"—that which is inscribed in all signs which enable their 
signifying function to occur. The trace is pure difference. The signifier "cat," for example, can 
only mean the small domestic animal o f our awareness because it does not mean—is different 
from—all the other words o f the Engl i sh language ("not dog, not horse, not tree, not 
phenomenology," etc.). The trace is thus the purely negative implicit inscription within all 
signifiers of all other signifiers. At this juncture, differance is born. If all meaning is purely 
relative (not that something" is relative to some "thing" else—which would ground the system— 
but that everything is relative to everything else), then meaning can never be fully present, but 
must always continue to "refer," "move," in an endless chain of "nots" beyond itself. We thus 
arrive at the "meaning" (explaining why Derrida says it does and does not exist) of differance, 
a hybrid term conflating "differ" and "defer." As "I" cannot exist without thought and language, 
which always "differs" from itself, the presence of "I" is endlessly deferred—"not" present, 
not I. Derrida's logic is thus an exact reversal of Descartes: "I think, therefore I'm not" 
17. With respect to the first point, here is a passage from The Unnamable which could 
almost have been written by Derrida as an exegesis of differance'. 
"I'll have said it, I'll have said it inside me, then in the same breath outside me, 
perhaps that's what I feel, an outside and an inside and me in the middle, 
perhaps that's what I am, the thing that divides the world in two, on the one 
side the outside, on the other the inside, that can be as thin as foil, I'm neither 
one side nor the other, I'm in the middle, I'm the partition, I've two surfaces 
and no thickness, perhaps that's what I feel, myself vibrating, I'm the tympanum, 
on the one hand the mind, on the other the world, I don't belong to either." 
Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable (New York: Grove, 1958) 134. 
18. The only punctuation in the play consists of the four periods following the four 
18 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
"mores," spoken by W, that initiate each of the four sections or "acts" of the play. Even the 
conclusion of each section lacks punctuation but simply "stops,'' an apparently deliberate ironic 
juxtaposition with the "stopping" period following each of the "mores." "More" initiates 
action but immediately "stops"; the "action" that follows "stops" in fact but not in form with 
a period. This relationship implies a kind of inherent "self'-contradiction, a condition entirely 
in harmony with differance. 
19. It thus constitutes a kind of grim Beckett paraphrase of the colloquial spiritual 
affirmation: "Stillborn again." 
20. Lyons 303. 
21. Katherine Worth, "Beckett's Auditors: Not I to Ohio Impromptu" in Beckett at 80/ 
Beckett in Context, ed. Enoch Brater (New York & Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986) 178. 
22. Samuel Beckett, Rockaby, in The Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett (New 
York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1984) 274. All subsequent citations from the play are taken from this 
edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text. 
23. Beckett's strategic bifurcation o f his protagonist into human presence and 
recorded voice generates a similar implication on the level of hearing. As Enoch Brater has 
noted, V's "eerie tone, modulated but always metallic, is never entirely human." The recorded 
voice is thus parallel to the rocked body, never "entirely" the possession of the protagonist, 
always "not" her's, even while seeming to be so. Enoch Brater, "Light, Sound, Movement, and 
Action in Beckett's Rockaby," in On Beckett: Essays and Criticism, ed. S. E. Gontarski (New 
York: Grove, 1986) 391. With reference to the rocking, Peter Gidal has observed that "the 
rocking movement. . . (is) given as a mechanism automatically rocking the rocking chair by an 
unseen machine, outside of any body movement," and S. E. Gontarski refers to "the unaided, 
almost supernatural movement of the rocker." Peter Gidal, Understanding Beckett: A Study of 
Monologue and Gesture in the Works of Samuel Beckett (London, Macmillan, 1986) 147. S. E. 
Gontarski, The Intent of Undoing in Samuel Beckett's Texts (Bloomington, Indiana UP, 1985) 
179. 
24. Hale 140. This basic scenario forms the predicate for a chorus of critical "theme 
and variations" on an essentially identical perspective. These range from the relatively 
straightforward, such as Charles Lyons—"The visual image of Rockaby, the woman in her 
elaborate black dress . . . in combination with the sparse details o f her search and its locale 
stimulate us to situate her in an alienating bourgeois urban environment. We organize these 
segments of information to create the context for the narrative of a woman's futile search for 
another like herself and her gradual abandoning of that effort, and ultimately—her use of her 
own image as a substitute for that other" (Lyons 309)—to more complex interpretations, such 
as Anna McMullan's: "The narrative summarizes its subject's existence as a perpetual search for 
an other . . . The desired other, however, is an other 'like' the self, whose need in turn for an 
other would reflect the need of the self, . . . The desire to perceive the other seems to be the desire 
for a reflection of the self, or rather, the desire to recognize the desire of the "self in the desire 
of the other. Should this other be found, the need of each, instead of circulating endlessly, would 
respond to the other, each becoming simultaneously subject and object of desire in a completed 
Fall 2000 12. 
cycle . . . " Anna McMullan, Theatre on Trial: Samuel Beckett's Later Drama (New York & 
London: Routledge, 1993) 105. 
25. Bert States, "Playing in Lyric Time: Beckett's Voice Plays," Theatre Journal 
40:4 (December, 1988) 455. 
26. That is to say, the mind perceives "itself as simply this—perceived, an object of 
conscious attention within consciousness; the per ceiver continually dissolves into the objects— 
thoughts, feelings, memories, etc.—of internal perception. 
27. Steven Connor, Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory and Text (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1988) 133. Worth 177. 
28. I am of course using the term "naturalistic" only in the most general sense of some 
sort of rudimentary "real world" scenario seemingly implied by the text. As Charles Lyons says, 
"The visual image of Rockaby, the woman in her elaborate black dress and head piece, in 
combination with the sparse details of her search and its locale stimulate us to situate her in an 
alienating bourgeois urban environment." Lyons 309. 
29. Both W/V and "mother" are dressed in black; the death of "mother" is indicated 
to be at night rather than the daytime. This double "darkness" seems clearly suggestive of the 
darkness within, with "dressed in black" also indicating a kind of perpetual mourning for this 
condition. "Death" in this context would thus signify the death of the self, or the possibility of 
self. Subjective death precedes objective death, which makes the latter, as in so many tragic 
conclusions, almost irrelevant. 
30. Linda Ben-Zvi, Samuel Beckett (Boston: Twayne, 1986) 179. 
31. For a comprehensive overview of Vedic philosophy, including selections from 
the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, see A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, ed. Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnam and Charles A. Moore (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957) xvii-xxxi, 3-223. 
Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature 
A scholarly journal that publishes essays on women's 
literature of all periods and nationalities 
Edited by Holly A. Laird 
Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature, the first journal devoted solely to women's literature, 
has for eighteen years published ground-breaking articles, notes, research, and reviews of 
literary, historicist, and theoretical work by established and emerging scholars in the field 
of women's literature and feminist theory. From its inception in 1982, Tulsa Studies has 
been devoted to the study of both literary and nonliterary texts—any and all works in 
every language and every historical period produced by women's pens. Having twice won 
the Council of Editors of Learned Journals (CELT) Award for Best Special Issue, Tulsa 
Studies in Women's Literature is an unequalled archive for those with teaching and 
research interests in women's literature and feminist criticism. 
ANNOUNCING VOLUME 19, NUMBER 2 (Fall 2000) 
Forum: Problems of Beauty in Feminist Studies 
Wounded Beauty: Race, Feminism, and the Aesthetic Question Anne Anlin Cheng 
How Do We Keep Desire from Passing with Beauty? Pamela L Caughie 
"Say That I Had a Lovely Face": The Grimms' "Rapunzel," Tennyson's 
"Lady of Shalott," and Atwood's Lady Oracle Shuli Barzilai 
Feminists in Brideland Lisa Walker 
Sho-Lo Showdown: The Do's and Don'ts of Lesbian Chic Jodi Schorb 
and Tania Hammidi 
Essays include: 
Mirrors, Marriage, and Nostalgia: Mother-Daughter Relations in Writings by 
Isabelle de Charriere and Elisabeth Vigee-Lebrun Katherine Ann Jensen 
Mothering Desire: The Romance Plot in Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale and 
Schaeffer's The Madness of a Seduced Woman Sarah R. Morrison 
RECENT SPECIAL ISSUE: Political Discourse/Women's Writing, 1640-1867 
Volume 17, Number % guest-edited by Teresa Feroli 
Subscribe now! 
Annual subscriptions: $12, individuals; $14, institutions; $10, students (with copy of I.D.) 
Back Issues: $7, U.S.; $8, elsewhere 
Mail subscriptions to: 
Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature, The University of Tulsa 
600 South College Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74104-3189 
Tel. (918) 631-2503; Fax: (918) 584-0623; Email: linda-frazier@utulsa.edu 
